e automatic evaluation literature and the survivability memory enhancement e ect (Nairne et al., 2007) suggest that stimuli might be automatically categorized along an approach/withdraw dimension. Duckworth et al. (2002) showed that such e ects hold even for novel stimuli. e current study is a more rigorous test of the idea that such e ects re ect a general organizing principle of cognitive-perceptual processing. Participants performed auditory (Experiment 1) or visual (Experiment 2) lexical decision. e pseudowords had been previously rated by di erent participants on subjective Danger and Usefulness. RTs for the pseudowords showed the same Danger × Usefulness interaction observed several times for real words: increasing Danger speeded RTs for words lower on Usefulness but slowed RTs for words higher on Usefulness. Danger and Usefulness classi cations are an integral part of routine stimulus processing from the very rst exposure. Results are discussed in terms of a general organizing principle of human cognition.
A large body of research suggests that the early stages of perceptual processing are sensitive to abstract semantic or a ective properties, re ecting a fundamental process of rapid, automatic evaluation of a stimulus as friend or foe (see Duckworth, Bargh, Garcia, and Chaiken (2002) for a summary). is evidence comes from work in areas as diverse as a ective priming, the mere exposure e ect, and automatic attitude activation. Related to this, a growing body of work on human memory suggests that there is something special about survival processing (Kang, McDermott, & Cohen, 2008; Nairne & Pandeirada, 2008a , 2008b Nairne, Pandeirada, Gregory, & Van Arsdall, 2009; Nairne, Pandeirada, & ompson, 2008; Nairne, ompson, & Pandeirada, 2007; Weinstein, Bugg, & Roediger, 2008; cf. Butler, Kang, & Roediger, 2009; Palmore, Garcia, Bacon, Johnson, & Kelemen, 2011) . In these memory studies, participants rate words on some dimension and are later surprised with a recall or recognition test. e manipulation of interest is the dimension on which the words are being rated. Memory performance is best when the words were rated on what the authors called Survivability. e rating instruction given in Nairne et al. (2007) was: In this task, we would like you to imagine that you are stranded in the grasslands of a foreign land, without any basic survival materials. Over the next few months you'll need to nd steady supplies of food and water and protect yourself from predators. We are going to show you a list of words, and we would like you to rate how relevant each of these words would be for you in this survival situation. Some of the words may be relevant and others may not -it's up to you to decide.
(p. 264)
Very many control conditions have been run, including a who's who of encoding strategies (e.g. imagery, valence, self-reference, and many control scenarios that match the Survivability scenario on novelty, arousal, and media exposure). e Survivability rating still produced better memory performance on both recall and recognition tests. ese ndings suggest an interesting link to a body of research on auditory word recognition. Several studies have demonstrated that the time required to recognize a spoken word is determined in part by that word's rated values on Danger and Usefulness for human survival, variables closely related to the Survivability scenario (Van Havermaet & Wurm, 2014; Witherell, Wurm, Seaman, Brugnone, & Fulford, 2012; Wurm, 2007; Wurm & Seaman, 2008; Wurm & Vakoch, 2000; Wurm, Vakoch, Aycock, & Childers, 2003; Wurm, Vakoch, Seaman, & Buchanan, 2004c; Wurm, Whitman, Seaman, Hill, & Ulstad, 2007) . In nearly all of these studies, spoken word recognition was faster for words rated higher on Usefulness (all but Van Havermaet & Wurm, 2014) and for words rated higher on Danger (all but Wurm et al., 2007) .
Even more intriguing than these main e ects is the signi cant Danger × Usefulness interaction, found in all of these studies except Wurm et al. (2003) . Figure 1 shows a general visualization of the interaction. For stimuli judged to be relatively low on Usefulness, the e ect of increasing Danger is to speed RTs. is e ect attens and reverses as Usefulness increases, so that the e ect of Danger is actually to slow RTs for stimuli judged to be relatively high on Usefulness. e relative positions of the two lines vary from study to study but this changing slope has been consistent. Beginning in Wurm and Vakoch (2000) , this interaction has been characterized as re ecting a response con ict insofar as items high on both Danger and Usefulness simultaneously engage both withdraw and approach behaviors. More will be said on this point below. One might wonder whether the observed e ects might be driven by other variables known to relate to RTs in lexical processing tasks. Across eight data sets that have shown the Danger × Usefulness interaction (seven published papers referenced above and one study in preparation), the intercorrelations between Danger, Usefulness, and dozens of other lexical processing variables were examined: Number of syllables; number of morphemes; age of acquisition; Uniqueness Point location; duration/length; bigram frequency (3 measures); word frequency/ familiarity; number of neighbors (4 measures); orthographic Levenshtein distance for the 20 nearest neighbors; sum/mean frequency of all/higher/lower-frequency neighbors (6 measures); entropy (13 measures derived from information theory); concreteness/imageability; morphological family size; grammatical class; and polysemy (number of meanings/senses). Danger was not systematically related to any of these variables. Usefulness was consistently related to word frequency/ familiarity, with an average correlation of .51 (range = .37 to .66). ere is no obvious way to get from these correlations to the Danger × Usefulness interaction shown in Figure 1 . In any event, frequency or familiarity was always added to the statistical models before any e ect of Danger or Usefulness was assessed. e idea that organisms routinely and automatically evaluate stimuli in terms of whether to approach them or withdraw from them is not new (e.g. Lewin, 1935; Schneirla, 1959) . Words are di cult stimuli, though (Gibson, 1966) . e relationships between words and what they stand for are arbitrary and the mappings have to be learned. us the idea that behaviorally-related semantic or a ective connotation should a ect early processing even of these stimuli, which stand between the perceiver and the actual stimuli with which a perceiver might interact, is far from obvious.
Nevertheless, as noted above, Wurm and Vakoch (2000) argued that the Danger × Usefulness interaction re ects an underlying response con ict, stemming from the fact that stimuli high on both dimensions may engage both approach and withdraw response predispositions. Wurm (2007) 
Pre-verbal infants demonstrate appropriate approach and avoidance movements to objects/events, and it is possible that as words are learned to refer to these objects/events, the danger and usefulness associated with the thing being signi ed also come to be associated with the sign (e.g. Solarz, 1960) . Danger and usefulness may thus become part of the total meaning of a word… In the complex situation of high usefulness combined with high danger, there will be more strategies that are adaptive in some way, which predicts the observed rise in RTs. (pp. 1220-1222) is explanation draws heavily from an idea in Pulvermüller's framework (1999 , 2001 Pulvermüller, Hauk, Nikulin, & Ilmoniemi, 2005a; Pulvermüller, Shtyrov, & Ilmoniemi, 2005b) : …neurons related to a word form become active together with neurons related to perceptions and actions re ecting aspects of its meaning… A content word may thus be laid down in the cortex as an assembly including a phonological (perisylvian) and a semantic (mainly extra-perisylvian) part (Pulvermüller, 1992) . A er such an assembly has formed, the phonological signal will be su cient for igniting the entire ensemble, including the semantic representation… (1999: 260, emphasis added) Most of the existing work in this area has looked not at Danger and Usefulness or Survivability, but has focused on a good/bad dimension called Valence (or Evaluation). Indeed, there is even work showing that automatic Valence/Evaluation e ects apply to the recognition of individual spoken words (Vakoch & Wurm, 1997; Wurm, 2011; Wurm, Labouvie-Vief, Aycock, Rebucal, & Koch, 2004a; Wurm & Vakoch, 1996; Wurm, Vakoch, & Seaman, 2004b) . Might this all come down to Valence, then, or is the Danger and Usefulness framework truly needed here? Valence has certainly been more thoroughly studied than Danger and Usefulness, but Wurm and Vakoch (2000) argued that it is di cult to know what to make of an a ective/semantic dimension with good and bad as endpoints. What does good mean? Good for whom, and to what end? How should one conceptualize items with good and bad connotations (e.g. electricity, elephant, pesticide, syringe)? is interpretational ambiguity is what led to the Danger and Usefulness framework. Why do we avoid things? Because they are dangerous. Why do we approach things? Because they are useful. Current models of cognitive processing largely ignore these why questions (Nairne & Pandeirada, 2010) . e evaluative space model (Cacioppo & Berntson, 1994; Cacioppo, Gardner, & Berntson, 1997 , 1999 , an in uential model from the attitudes literature, deals with the interpretational ambiguity while maintaining a Valence-based focus. It separates Valence into two dimensions, Positivity and Negativity. Constructs can be located anywhere on both dimensions, with no necessary connection between the two. It allows for ambivalence (high on both dimensions), indi erence (low on both), or unambiguous Positivity or Negativity. It seems di cult to get from Valence (even if separated into Positivity and Negativity) to the Danger × Useful ness interaction shown in Figure 1 . Even if it were possible, though, separating Positivity from Negativity begs the question of what positive and negative mean. e di culty in capturing this crucial piece of the puzzle is not remedied by assigning each to its own dimension.
ere are also appraisal theories of emotion which suggest that an early evaluation process determines the extent to which particular stimuli become relevant to current goals. Appraisals of high relevance enhance attentional processing for those stimuli (Sander, Grandjean, & Scherer, 2005 ; cf. the "signi cance" notion of Bradley, 2009 ; see also Schimmack, 2005) . In fact, this kind of explanation is similar to that given in the Wurm and Seaman (2008) study on Danger and Usefulness. However, it is important to note that the concept of relevance is not easier to understand than the concept of Valence.
A nal argument as to the necessity of the newer framework comes from statistical considerations. Wurm (2007) showed that Danger and Usefulness explain more variance in lexical processing times, compared to alternative approaches built on Evaluation/Valence. Furthermore, in that study Danger and Usefulness e ects (including an interaction similar to that shown in Figure 1 ) were signicant over and above the e ects of Valence and Arousal. For all of these reasons, it is extremely unlikely that the Danger and Usefulness e ects found in previous studies are really just Valence e ects.
e Survivability memory enhancement e ect and the Danger and Usefulness e ects can be viewed as relying on information stored in memory. at is, a stimulus's relevance for survival might be one of several characteristics stored in memory and retrieved when that stimulus is encountered. e Danger and Usefulness framework in fact states fairly explicitly that the relevant connotative information is stored in memory, having become part of what a word means.
Two complementary strands of research suggest that this assumption might be incorrect. Both made clever use of pseudowords or other nonsense stimuli, which by de nition cannot have memory representations. In one strand, researchers have shown that a single exposure to a novel word is enough to create a memory trace that lasts for at least one week (De Vaan, Ernestus, & Schreuder, 2011; see also De Vaan, Schreuder, & Baayen, 2007) . In another, researchers have found intriguing priming e ects that are related to the emotional valence of nonsense stimuli (Duckworth et al., 2002) .
In the Duckworth et al. (2002) study, participants named printed nouns faster when they were primed by novel sounds or novel images with similar Valence.
is result at the very least suggests that information retrieved from memory is not what drives the underlying e ects, and that they might instead re ect a fundamental characteristic of initial stimulus processing. e current study tests this hypothesis in a di erent way and allows for the elimination of a plausible rival explanation. Speci cally, the current study will allow for a test of whether any observed e ects depend on reference to similar existing stimuli (real words). e Duckworth et al. novel stimuli are less easily tested for this. Phonetic transcriptions were not provided for the spoken novel primes, some of which appeared from their orthographic renderings to violate the phonotactic rules of English, and the whole question appears to be intractable with the visual primes, which were akin to abstract art.
In the current study people were asked to provide Danger or Usefulness ratings for spoken (Preliminary Rating Study 1) and printed (Preliminary Rating Study 2) English pseudowords. In two subsequent experiments, the relationships between these ratings and auditory (Experiment 1) or visual (Experiment 2) lexical decision times were assessed.
If Danger and Usefulness e ects are found with pseudoword stimuli, it would suggest that rapid assessment of stimuli on these dimensions is a fundamental characteristic of cognitive-perceptual processing. It would also rule out a frequency-based alternative explanation because pseudowords by de nition have frequencies of zero (Wurm, 2000) . In fact, because pseudowords have no semantic content, such a nding would also help rule out nearly all alternative explanations based on semantics.
Preliminary Rating Study 1: Spoken Pseudowords From Wurm (2011)
e purpose of Preliminary Rating Study 1 was to get stimulus ratings for the spoken pseudowords used in Wurm (2011) . As is generally the case in lexical processing studies, the theoretical questions addressed by Wurm (2011) concerned only the real word stimuli, and as a result, the pseudowords were never rated and their RTs never analyzed.
Method
Stimuli. Stimuli were 40 pseudowords, each of which was created by changing one or two randomly-determined phonemes in a noun selected from a large dictionary. For example, the pseudoword [h sp] was created by changing the nal phoneme in the real word husk [h sk].
A male speaker unfamiliar with the purpose or hypotheses of the study recorded the stimuli, which were digitized at a sampling rate of 22.05 kHZ and stored in individual disc les. e range of durations was from 354 to 661 ms (M = 510, SD = 80.4).
Participants. Twenty three participants rated each stimulus on Danger, and 23 rated each stimulus on Usefulness. Participants received either extra credit in a psychology course or cash in exchange for participating. All participants reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision and hearing and all were native speakers of English.
Procedure. Participants were tested one at a time in a sound-shielded chamber or quiet room. Digitized speech les were played over headphones at a comfortable listening level chosen by each participant. Participants were directed to rate the Danger or Usefulness of each stimulus for human survival using an eight-point scale.
Instructions for the Usefulness condition were as follows: "We are going to play for you a list of nonsense words and we would like you to rate how useful each one is for human survival. is task may seem di cult or strange, but do the best you can. ere are no right or wrong answers. " Endpoints of the scale were labeled "Not at all useful for human survival" (1) and "Extremely useful for human survival" (8). Instructions and the rating scale in the Danger condition were identical except that the word "dangerous" replaced the word "useful. " e second sentence was added to the instructions to indicate to participants that the oddness of the task was understood, but that it was still thought reasonable to ask them to do it. Aside from the addition of that sentence and the word nonsense in the preceding one, this is the same method used to collect ratings across several studies of real-word stimuli (e.g. Wurm, 2007; Wurm & Seaman, 2008; Wurm & Vakoch, 2000) .
Participants made their ratings by entering integers from 1 to 8.
For each item, mean ratings on Danger and on Usefulness were calculated. Figure 2 shows histograms and quantile-quantile plots of these means and illustrates two points. First, item means were restricted to a fairly small range on each dimension. is contrasts with previous studies of real words, in which item means usually run for nearly the full range on both variables. Duckworth et al. (2002) similarly found that their novel stimuli were given less extreme ratings than their familiar stimuli. Second, the distributions of means were roughly normal. e solid lines in the bottom two panels of Figure 2 show what would be expected for perfectly normal distributions, and as can be seen, the deviations from this ideal are minor. 
Experiment 1: Spoken Pseudowords From Wurm (2011)
Do Danger and Usefulness e ects re ect associations that have been learned, or are they already evident upon initial exposure to a stimulus? e information represented by Danger and Usefulness is of crucial importance in terms of survival, so it would seem to make sense to give it processing priority. At the same time, given the arbitrariness of the relationship between a word and what it stands for, it is not clear how the e ects could be present upon initial stimulus exposure.
If previous demonstrations of the Danger × Usefulness interaction re ect a general processing principle, the mean ratings obtained in Preliminary Rating Study 1 should have value in predicting auditory lexical decision times. If the interaction instead relies on information stored in memory representations, the means should not have value in predicting auditory lexical decision times.
In this experiment data from Wurm (2011) are presented. e pseudoword data that are the focus of the current experiment were not presented in any way, because the theoretical questions addressed by Wurm (2011) concerned only the real word stimuli. Also excluded here are all data from a community sample of older participants (ages 60-92) in the Wurm (2011) study, to maintain maximum comparability with the existing literature. All previous studies on Danger and Usefulness used people from the participant pool.
Method
Stimuli. Pseudoword stimuli were described above. Real words were 40 common nouns. Stimuli are shown in Appendix A.
Participants. Participants were 57 students from the Wayne State University Department of Psychology participant pool. ey received extra credit in a psychology course for participating. All reported normal hearing and all were native speakers of English.
Procedure. Participants were tested one at a time in a sound-shielded chamber. Digitized speech les were played over headphones at a comfortable listening level chosen by each participant. Participants were directed to make a speeded lexical decision about each item by pressing one button for words and another for pseudowords. RTs were measured from the acoustic onset of each stimulus. Before the main experiment, participants heard a practice list containing 20 stimuli that were not used in the main experiment.
Data analysis. Logged RTs were suitably normal without any data trimming. ey were analyzed with a multilevel linear mixed-e ects analysis, 1 using version 3.0.2 of the R statistical language (R Core Team, 2013) and version 1.0-6 of the lme4 package (Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 2014) . All continuous predictors were mean centered prior to analysis. e analysis was done hierarchically, because the statistical signi cance of main e ects cannot be meaningfully interpreted in a model that also contains interactions (Cohen & Cohen, 1983) . Main e ects were entered simultaneously in one step, followed by the Danger × Usefulness interaction in a second step.
Statistical signi cance testing was done by a series of single-df likelihood ratio tests (Baayen, Davidson, & Bates, 2008; Bates et al., 2014) comparing models that were tted using maximum likelihood estimation.
In addition to Danger and Usefulness, trial number was included to index possible practice or fatigue e ects, as was the duration of each stimulus in ms (log transformed to improve normality). A measure of lexical neighborhood density was also included, based on the number of competitors measure that has been used in previous auditory lexical decision studies (e.g. Wurm, 2007; Wurm et al., 2007) . In each of these studies auditory word recognition took longer for stimuli from denser neighborhoods, re ecting the di culty of disambiguating a stimulus from others that are similar. As applied here, it is the number of real English words still consistent with a given stimulus up to the phoneme just before it becomes a pseudoword. For example, [h sp] diverges from all real English words at the /p/. Prior to that point, the partial stimulus is still consistent with words such as husky, hustle, and seven others. is stimulus thus has nine auditory competitors. To control for possible neighbor frequency e ects, the highest frequency value among the competitors of each stimulus was also included in the analysis.
. Barr, Levy, Scheepers, and Tily (2013) argue in favor of maximal models, with both random intercepts and random slopes, but the models reported in this study are intercept-only models. Adding slope terms to the random e ects changed no statistical conclusions. It did, however, produce perfect correlations among random e ects in Experiment 1. Baayen, Davidson, and Bates (2008) note that this signals overparameterization. In the example they present, the variance associated with the slope is only 7% as much as that associated with the intercept. Baayen et al. say that this "…suggests that the by-subject adjustments are small and potentially redundant" (p. 395) and so they drop the slope term and return to an intercept-only model. For the current study the slope terms have on average less than 2% as much variance associated with them, compared to the intercepts. us the intercept-only models are retained.
Trials on which the lexical decision was made incorrectly were discarded (8.6% of the data). Table 1 shows unstandardized regression coe cients and 95% condence intervals for the statistical analysis. ere was an extremely strong e ect of item duration, with longer items having longer RTs as expected. RTs were longer for items from dense neighborhoods, also as expected. Neither trial number nor neighbor frequency was signi cant. Danger and Usefulness both had signi cant main e ects, but their interpretation must be quali ed by their signi cant interaction. It is shown in Figure 3 .
To create this plot all regressor variables were set to their mean values (i.e. zero, because they were centered) except Danger and Usefulness. Danger was de ned as a vector running from the lowest to the highest mean-centered values actually observed in the rating data. e L line shows the Danger e ect with Usefulness set to the lowest mean-centered value observed in the data, and the H line shows the Danger e ect with Usefulness set to the highest mean-centered value observed in the data. As is clear from the gure, even though the ranges on both Danger and Useful ness are restricted, the slope relationship changes just as in several previous demonstrations with real words (see Figure 1 ; Van Havermaet & Wurm, 2014; Witherell et al., 2012; Wurm, 2007; Wurm & Seaman, 2008; Wurm & Vakoch, 2000; Wurm et al., 2004c Wurm et al., , 2007 . Increasing Danger speeds RTs for stimuli that are low on Usefulness, but as Usefulness increases, this e ect becomes inhibitory. As mentioned above, this inhibitory relationship is hypothesized to stem from the simultaneous engagement of both approach and withdraw response processes.
What the current experiment shows is that activation of these response tendencies is enough to slow RTs even in the case of a stimulus that has no meaning. e fact that this pattern emerges even for stimuli that have not been encountered before (and thus do not have memory representations) suggests that it re ects a general processing characteristic. e perceptual system seems to rapidly assess incoming stimuli for the potential threat they pose, even before or without semantic processing. Also important, and evaluated in real time, is the potential usefulness of stimuli. is all takes place from the very rst exposure as a part of routine processing.
e role of real-word associates. One might wonder whether the observed data pattern is caused by the partial activation of real words that are called to mind by the presented stimuli. To test this possibility, 32 new participants from the Wayne State University Department of Psychology participant pool listened to each of the pseudowords, played in random order, and were given seven seconds to write down the rst word that came to mind. e most common response was retained as the real word most closely associated with each pseudoword. Ratings were needed for these associates, but the speaker who recorded the original stimuli was no longer available. e decision was made to present the to-be-rated associates visually rather than to introduce a di erent speaker. us, because the stimuli had to be printed anyway, associate ratings were gathered online. Wurm and Cano (2010; see also Barenboym, Wurm, & Cano, 2010) note some potential problems this introduces, and one of their proposed solutions is to increase the sample size beyond the 20 or 30 that are typically called upon to make such ratings. Wurm and Seaman (2008) found a correlation of .96 between Usefulness ratings given to printed and spoken words, and .97 for Danger ratings. Additional evidence that this strategy is not problematic is presented in Experiment 2.
A separate group of 250 students viewed these associates in random order and provided ratings on the same eight-point scales described above (126 rated Danger; 124 rated Usefulness). For each item, a mean Associate Danger and Associate Usefulness value were calculated from the ratings.
e analysis shown in Table 1 was re-run, but these Associate Danger and Associate Usefulness values were used instead of the Danger and Usefulness of each pseudoword itself. e results of this analysis are shown in Table 2 . ere was no e ect of Associate Danger, Associate Usefulness, or their interaction.
us, the ratings of the real word most closely associated to each pseudoword do not produce the data pattern observed in Experiment 1. 
Preliminary Rating Study 2: Printed Pseudowords
e purposes of Experiment 2 have to do with the generalizability of the results. e rst purpose is to determine whether a visual analog to Experiment 1 shows similar e ects. To date only three studies have examined Danger and Usefulness e ects with visual presentation, with one nding the Danger × Usefulness interaction (Wurm et al., 2004c) , one not nding it (Witherell et al., 2012) , and one nding it as part of a higher-order interaction involving an additional predictor (Van Havermaet & Wurm, 2014) . e second purpose is to improve the stimulus creation process. e pseudowords used in Experiment 1 were created by the method typical of the earlier studies, which is to simply choose an existing English word and change a phoneme or two. Despite the follow-up analyses involving the most common associate of each pseudoword from Experiment 1, it is conceivable that subconscious processes could make certain phoneme substitutions more attractive than others, and that results are somehow driven by experimenter intuitions (Forster, 2000) .
Method
Stimuli. e lead article posted on the website of the Detroit Free Press on January 26, 2011 ("Oakland o cial:", 2011) was used. e article had 402 words including the title, 232 of which were unique. Morphologically complex items and proper nouns were discarded, as were items with fewer than three letters, leaving 94 words.
Each word was entered into the Wuggy pseudoword generator (Keuleers & Brysbaert, 2010) . Wuggy proposed 10 pseudoword candidates for each word, and the one with the least dense lexical neighborhood was chosen (see Data Analysis section below). Each of these is thus minimally like the word on which it is based. ese stimuli are shown in Appendix B, and indeed, it is di cult to guess what words they might be based on.
Participants. Participants were 401 students from the Department of Psychology participant pool at Wayne State University. 201 rated words on Danger and 200 rated them on Usefulness (the numbers were this large because these ratings were gathered online -see e role of real-word associates above). All were native speakers of English and all reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision. ey received extra credit in a psychology class for their participation.
Procedure. e procedure was similar to that used in Preliminary Rating Study 1 except that words were printed one at a time in the center of the computer monitor, with the rating scale below.
Results and Discussion
For each item, mean ratings on Danger and on Usefulness were calculated. Figure 4 shows histograms and quantile-quantile plots of these means. As in Experiment 1, item means were restricted to a fairly small range on each dimension. Nevertheless, as in the auditory experiment there was some variance in the item means, and the distributions of means were roughly normal. 
Method
Stimuli. Pseudoword stimuli were described above. Ninety-four length-matched real words were also used for the lexical decision task.
ese are shown in Appendix B.
Participants. Participants were 45 students from the Department of Psychology participant pool at Wayne State University. All were native speakers of English and all reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision. ey received extra credit in a psychology class for their participation. One participant was allowed to participate twice because of an error. Only data from the rst session were analyzed.
Procedure. e procedure was similar to that in Experiment 1, except that stimuli were printed on a computer screen rather than played over headphones. Participants were directed to make a speeded lexical decision about each item by pressing one button for words and another for pseudowords. Before the main experiment, participants saw a practice list containing 24 stimuli that were not used in the main experiment.
Data analysis. e analysis was parallel to that in Experiment 1, di ering in two ways that had to do with the change in processing modality. First, item length was de ned in terms of the number of letters (logged to improve normality) rather than in ms (logged). Second, instead of the auditory competitors measure, a measure of lexical neighborhood density found to be important in visual lexical processing was used: the average orthographic Levenshtein distance between a stimulus and its nearest 20 lexical neighbors (OLD20; Yarkoni, Balota, & Yap, 2008) . ese values were calculated using the vwr package (Keuleers, 2011) and version 2.11.1 of the R statistical language (R Core Team, 2013) .
Results and Discussion
Trials on which the lexical decision was made incorrectly were discarded (10.1% of the data). Unlike the auditory RTs in Experiment 1, the visual RTs required trimming as well as logging in order to achieve acceptable normality. RTs faster than 500 (3.3% of the data) or slower than 1800 ms (4.7% of the data) were discarded. Table 3 shows the results of the statistical analysis. ere was no e ect of trial number but strong e ects of stimulus length and neighborhood density. Higher values of OLD20 were associated with faster RTs. Higher values indicate less dense lexical neighborhoods, so this e ect is in the same direction as the analogous signi cant e ect found in Experiment 1. e e ect of neighbor frequency was signi cant, in contrast to Experiment 1. Pseudowords with higher neighbor frequencies took longer to reject in the lexical decision task. e Usefulness e ect was strong and signi cant as in Experiment 1. Here, though, the sign of the Danger e ect was di erent from that observed in Experiment 1 and it was not signi cant. However, just as in Experiment 1, interpretation of main e ects must be quali ed by their signi cant interaction.
is interaction is shown in Figure 5 . As is clear from the gure, the nature of the slope changes is the same here as it was with auditory presentation and a di erent stimulus set. e current experiment reinforces the conclusions of Experiment 1. In addition, by using a di erent processing modality and improved stimulus creation, it allows for a more general interpretation of the main results. It appears that no matter the processing modality, rapid assessment of the Danger and Usefulness of novel stimuli is a routine part of cognitive-perceptual processing.
e role of real-word associates. As in Experiment 1, follow-up analyses were used to test the rival hypothesis that it is actually the Danger and Usefulness of the most closely associated real words that drive the observed e ects. A di erent 32 participants viewed each of the pseudowords used in Experiment 2 on a computer screen, in random order, and were given seven seconds on each trial to write down the word that rst came to mind. e most common associate of each pseudoword was then rated on Danger and Usefulness using the same scales described above. e participants who rated these associates were the same as those who rated the associates of the auditory stimuli from Experiment 1 (126 rated Danger; 124 rated Usefulness). ese ratings were used to calculate mean Associate Danger and mean Associate Usefulness values for each item. e analysis shown in Table 3 was re-run, but Associate Danger and Associate Usefulness were used instead of the Danger and Usefulness of each pseudoword itself. e results of this analysis are shown in Table 4 . As can be seen, no e ects emerged involving either of these variables.
As in the auditory experiment, the actual ratings for the pseudowords themselves were then added to the model shown in Table 4 . All three key e ects were signi cant (for Danger, B = .029, 95% CI = [0.000, 0.057], p = .0470; for Usefulness, B = .086, 95% CI = [0.044, 0.128], p < .001; for Danger × Usefulness, B = .060, 95% CI = [0.016, 0.103], p = .0075).
e conclusion from the auditory experiment largely holds here, too: Not only do the associate ratings not produce the observed pattern by themselves, they do not even alter the observed pattern other than to make the Danger main e ect (which was marginal in Table 3 ) signi cant. e Danger × Usefulness interaction is found for novel auditory and visual stimuli. 
General Discussion
De Vaan et al. (2007) found that a single exposure to a novel word was su cient to leave a detectable trace in lexical memory, and De Vaan et al. (2011) found that such traces last for at least a week. e current study demonstrates that novel spoken and verbal stimuli are processed or categorized on behaviorally-relevant a ective dimensions. e current study demonstrates that upon participants' very rst encounter with novel spoken or printed verbal material, the time it takes to determine that a stimulus is not a real English word is co-determined by the same Danger × Usefulness interaction previously observed in several experiments with real words. For novel stimuli rated lower on Usefulness, increasing Danger had the e ect of speeding up RTs. For novel stimuli rated higher on Usefulness, increasing Danger had the e ect of slowing down RTs. e expected interaction emerged even though the ranges of mean ratings for the novel stimuli were somewhat restricted.
Because the novel stimuli could not have existing memory representations, the results indicate that previous demonstrations of Danger and Usefulness e ects using real words as stimuli do not depend on retrieving information stored from lexical memory, or on a learned association between a wordform and its referent. Follow-up analyses in both experiments showed that the e ects were not caused by the semantic representations of the closest real-word associates. e many di erences between Experiments 1 and 2 of the current study speak to the generality of the e ects observed. ese di erences include the sen- Table 4 . Reanalysis of log visual lexical decision time using associate values (Experiment 2).
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Step sory processing modality, the number of rating participants, the rating methodology itself, and the similarity of the pseudowords to real words. In spite of these di erences, both experiments produced evidence of the same changing slope relationship. In addition to ruling out several potential competing explanations of the observed data pattern, this gives increased con dence that the results are not due to the combination of characteristics speci c to any one experimental methodology. Examination of the stimuli from Experiment 2 (Appendix B) raises two issues worth noting in this context. First, there is a strong correlation between the Danger and Usefulness ratings (.70). is raises the possibility that participants made these ratings on the basis of some third variable, which could conceivably provide an alternative explanation for the observed ndings. Fortunately it is not a pattern that holds generally. Danger and Usefulness were signi cantly negatively correlated in Wurm and Vakoch (2000) , and were uncorrelated in Experiment 1 of the current study, as well as in Van Havermaet and Wurm (2014) , Witherell et al. (2012) , Wurm (2007) , Wurm et al. (2007) , and Wurm and Seaman (2008) . All of these studies found essentially the same Danger × Usefulness interaction. is shows that the pattern does not require any particular underlying correlation, but rather, is pervasive.
Second, and related to this, it is also evident from Appendix B that both Danger and Usefulness ratings are correlated with item length (.61 and .60, respectively) . Again, though, these correlations are much less worrisome across experiments. ey were both < .26 in Experiment 1, and neither was signi cant. In the seven previous published studies that found the Danger × Usefulness interaction, the correlations between Danger and length/duration ranged from −.03 to .20 and was never signi cant. e correlations between Usefulness and length/duration ranged from −.11 to −.06 and was never signi cant.
It bears repeating, too, that in all preceding studies as well as in the current study, length/duration was always statistically controlled in the analyses prior to any evaluation of the Danger × Usefulness interaction. All of this speaks to the strength and pervasiveness of the observed e ects.
Demonstrating these e ects without using any kind of priming or explicit approach/withdraw responses such as lever pulls increases con dence in the interpretation that they are a routine part of processing. Demonstrating these e ects without using stimuli purposely chosen for extremity also increases condence in this interpretation.
No model of word recognition would have a way of predicting such e ects in pseudowords, except to the extent that they are similar enough to real words to activate their existing semantic representations (Wurm, 2000) . is type of explanation seemed unlikely for either experiment in the current study, and it was ruled out by follow-up analyses using the real words most closely associated with the stimuli. However, although researchers working on feature-based approaches to semantics do not claim to fully capture meaning (e.g. Antonucci & Reilly, 2008 ; see also Fodor, Garrett, Walker, & Parkes, 1980 , who pointed out the impossibility of ever doing so), a feature-based approach might prove workable for the rst stage of the proposed two-pass model described more fully below (Wurm, 2007 (Wurm, , 2011 Wurm et al., 2004b Wurm et al., , 2007 .
One of the features in McRae, de Sa, and Seidenberg's (1997) model is is dangerous, and when generating feature lists, subjects do seem to think about the uses to which objects can be put. In McRae Cree, Seidenberg, and McNorgan, (2005) , 693 of the 2526 features generated (27%) begin with the word used as in used for storing beer and used by Catholics. However, almost none of these has anything to do with survival. Wurm's two-pass model posits not only that is useful for human survival should be a feature, but that it should play a primary role in early processing. In previous work with real words, the Usefulness e ect has been two to six times larger than the Danger e ect. In the current study, Usefulness e ects were 1.3 (Experiment 1) and 3.2 (Experiment 2) times larger.
A Two-Pass Model of Meaning Extraction
e results of the current study con rm a prediction of the two-pass model brie y mentioned above (Wurm, 2007 (Wurm, , 2011 Wurm et al., 2004b Wurm et al., , 2007 . e model is built on two ideas. One is the central notion in embodied approaches that perception is for action. e other is that word recognition should be characterized as an interactive, cascaded process, in which the results of one stage in the analysis can be used elsewhere before processing at that stage is complete. is borrows from New Look theories from the 1940s and 1950s, which posited that preconscious processing of some aspects of a stimulus could a ect subsequent processing of that same stimulus (Kitayama & Niedenthal, 1994; Wurm, Vakoch, Strasser, Calin-Jageman, & Ross, 2001 ).
e value of Danger in a perception/action framework is obvious, but it is not su cient. Organisms need to avoid being eaten or destroyed, but they also need to nd and obtain desirable (i.e. useful) resources. Wurm et al. (2004b) noted that "information exchange is bene cial to the extent that the observer learns about both of these characteristics" (p. 175; Darwin, 1859 Darwin, /1968 Davidson, 1992; Schneirla, 1965) . Work on Danger and Usefulness is aimed at explicating the organizing principle, at grounding the how and why of these interrelationships by revealing more about the nature of the information that is used. Danger and Usefulness were chosen for this framework speci cally with embodiment in mind.
ey have strong relationships to survival, and they are behaviorally relevant. In this framework a rapid, automatic rst pass gives rough information about Danger and Usefulness. Sometimes information from this rst stage alone will be enough for preparations to be made for an approach or withdraw response, even before a full semantic analysis (the second pass) has taken place. at is, it is not crucial that the perceptual system be entirely sure of what the stimulus is in order for preparation of behavioral responses to be initiated. On this account, a certain kind of response preparation (withdraw) is made whenever there are connotations of Danger, regardless of what stimulus is being processed. A di erent kind of response preparation (approach) is made whenever there are connotations of Usefulness, regardless of what stimulus is being processed. e simultaneous detection of both kinds of connotations leads to con icting response preparations. us for things high on Usefulness, increasing Danger should be associated with slower RTs, because such things activate two con icting response patterns. Such a con ict ts within an embodied perspective, as it could stem from a lack of situational context allowing the di ering actions to be activated simultaneously (Barsalou, 2008; Yeh & Barsalou, 2006) . e unusual prediction that the same interaction should be observed for pseudowords was based on the hypothesis that within this framework, behavior can be executed based solely on the partial information available from the rough rst pass. Until the current study, this hypothesis had no empirical support. Now there is evidence that the con ict created by a stimulus high on both Danger and Usefulness is evident even for stimuli devoid of meaning, so the con ict seems to arise at the model's presumed rst stage. at is why the same interaction was expected to appear for pseudowords, and indeed it did. e current study shows that the observed e ects do not arise from information stored at the lexical level, but might they somehow be tied to phonemes or letters? ere is some intriguing evidence of non-arbitrariness in sound-meaning relationships suggesting that this could be so. As noted by Duckworth et al. (2002) , Miron (1961) found a relationship between place-of-articulation and Valence that holds cross-culturally, even for preverbal infants. Recent work on phonesthemes (e.g. the /gl/ from glitter, glisten, glide, glow, etc.) and sound symbolism suggests that there is some non-arbitrariness found in natural languages and that this helps learners with certain aspects of acquisition (Monaghan, Christiansen, & Fitneva, 2011) . In addition, Song and Schwarz (2009) found a relationship between the processing uency of novel words and the perceived risk or danger associated with them. On the one hand, research such as this suggests that Danger and Usefulness e ects might be due to systematic mappings between sublexical units and semantics. However, the non-arbitrary aspects of sound-meaning correspondence are not widespread in language - Monaghan et al. (2011) call them "small pockets of systematicity" -and one might wonder whether they could drive processing results like those seen here.
Additional work on such questions would be valuable, but at the same time there is good reason to believe that the e ects are not limited to language. Such a conclusion would make sense, because it would be di cult to maintain that the perceptual system processes the Danger and Usefulness of symbols standing for things, but does not process these aspects of the things themselves. Evidence from the current study along with the ndings of Duckworth et al. (2002) and the memory work of Nairne and colleagues suggest that Wurm's two-pass model targeted the wrong level of analysis. e model was created to explain lexical processing, but it would seem that the e ects re ect a more general processing characteristic that is operational more or less continuously with any kind of stimuli.
Two kinds of studies show that related e ects apply to processes other than word recognition, and thus bolster this assertion. Duckworth et al. 's (2002) Experiment 2 used novel images resembling abstract art as primes for naming, and demonstrated a Valence-based congruence e ect. In Experiment 3 they used those same images and no verbal response at all, but rather a push or pull of a lever. Still they found a Valence-based congruence e ect (pull mapping better to positive Valence; push mapping better to negative Valence; see also the classic work of Chen & Bargh, 1999) . is suggests a general processing principle.
Work by Nairne and others on human memory, described in the Introduction, also supports the idea that Danger and Usefulness e ects re ect a general processing principle. Because the Survivability rating instruction contains elements of both Danger and Usefulness, the resulting memory enhancement provides yet more support for the idea that the observed Danger and Usefulness e ects re ect a general cognitive principle. Taken with the ndings and theoretical considerations outlined above, this suggests that Danger and Usefulness processing can be thought of as a lens or lter through which all incoming stimuli are routinely viewed.
How might such cognitive-semantic interactions have arisen? Danger and Usefulness carry not only semantic but also emotional information, providing real-time information relevant to behavioral motivations and survival (e.g. Lewin, 1935; Schneirla, 1959) . Öhman and Mineka (2001) gave an evolutionary account of fear and threat processing. Central to this account is a fear module that has been shaped over long periods of time by selection pressures. e Danger and Usefulness framework meshes well with an evolutionary account: "…pay-ing attention to the Danger and Usefulness of objects… has served organisms well for millions of years… language developed on top of this existing… framework" (Wurm & Vakoch, 2000: 187) . Such accounts, though, typically focus on the Danger aspect of survival to the exclusion of the other side of the adaptiveness coin -Usefulness. e current study again underscores the need to consider both (e.g. Wurm et al., 2004b Real words: bird, car, crime, deceit, diamond, doll, door, fraud, frog, girl, heart, honey, hospital, hotel, insect, kettle, kitten, lamp, lion, method, moment, money, mountain, movie, music, ocean, owl, palace, priest, song, stool, stove, thief, tobacco, tomb, umbrella, village, window, woman, youth
Note. Only the pseudowords were presented in the rating task. Presentation of stimuli was auditory for both the rating and lexical decision tasks. 
Appendix B
